A common adage about seven-game playoff series is that there comes a point where adjustments no longer matter. A place where execution ability and talent are inherited. This is true to some extent in most high-level games between two elite teams, including the current game between the Denver Nuggets and Minnesota Timberwolves.
With their backs against the wall at 3-2 in the series and struggling to find answers for Nikola Jokic and his teammates, the Wolves defense has nothing left to offer the Nuggets, or at least nothing to offer. It felt like I couldn't do it. new to provide. The downside to presenting your cards early in the series is that once the problem appears resolved, panic can ensue and identity can be lost.
Operational terminology: loss of identity. It can be as simple as walking away from something that worked, or continuing to use something that worked, but not executing it to the same degree. The Timberwolves could just as easily have fallen into this trap themselves and opened the series with a 2-0 lead. Two major advances were met with backlash and a step back from where they started.
How did they react? The answer, as the Timberwolves demonstrated brilliantly when they defeated the Nuggets 115-70 to take the series to a decisive Game 7, was to take a step back in order to move forward.
In this sense, going backwards meant leaving the overarching coverage choices unchanged and not doing (it seemed) anything shockingly new. They actually played the same old cards they flashed to the Nuggets. It's a risky proposition for a team whose ability to adjust is almost unparalleled.
But just as there was a method to the madness of Jokic attempting to score a goal alone against the four-time Defensive Player of the Year, returning to extensively scouted coverage There was also a certain amount of madness.
But Chris Finch and Mika Nori's calculated gamble worked perfectly, and you only need to look at this particular coverage the Timberwolves employed in Games 1 and 2 to see why.
Here is an example. Look at KAT when the Nuggets empty the wing and run PnR with Jamal and Jokic.
When Jamal got off, he ignored Jamal and stayed in position to finish off Jokic's pop three. This is because Rudy was Roman and was in a position to rotate the opposing drive. https://t.co/zYL3ek3hP1 pic.twitter.com/iOE74dvE1g
— Joe Viray (@JoeVirayNBA) May 6, 2024
And compare this to the one in game 6.
No matter how hard you squint to see any visible differences, there really isn't any. that's exactly the point. Jokic will be guarded by a foursome (either Karl-Anthony Towns or Naz Reid), and Rudy Gobert will stay near the rim away from Aaron Gordon.
In Games 3, 4, and 5, the Timberwolves stumbled in this coverage and were forced to minimize its use, resulting in Gobert having to guard Jokic in one coverage, The result was less than ideal. Quickly running out of ideas, they simply remembered another common saying. If it ain't broke, don't fix it. Their mistake was thinking that the initial coverage was broken to begin with.
Another effective phrase is: execution. The Wolves eliminated any kinks in the run that allowed the Nuggets to fight back and take the lead. The name of the game heading into this series was not allowing Jokic to dominate the half-court offense, either as a scorer or a passer. Most teams often force him to choose between two poisons. The Wolves found a way to take away both options in the first two games.
The aforementioned coverage took away Jokic's ability to be a short-roll passer, which was a theme of the Timberwolves' defensive plan in Game 1. They unleashed another way to take Jokic out of the half-court offense in Game 2. It was a send-in. He hit a double from the top of the key during Jokic's post-up, forcing the ball out of his hands and relying on rotation behind the double to close the gap.
The trickle-down effect of first coverage not working is that Gobert guarding Jokic one-on-one means there's little reason for the Timberwolves to send a double toward the post, and the second coverage's This means that the usage rate has decreased significantly. But in Game 6, the Timberwolves gained even more momentum, doubling nearly every post-up from Jokic, no matter who they were playing.
As expected from the best defense in the league, the rotation behind the double was perfect.
On the surface, the core of the Wolves' problems was solved by adapting old tactics. But it's not entirely accurate to say they weren't doing anything completely new.
The key pressure point the Timberwolves had to respond to was Jokic advancing toward Gobert and isolating him in the post. The Wolves obviously had no problem with this, but it also meant rolling the dice on a defender whose greatest strength is not in one-on-one situations, but in a team defense concept with him as the central anchor.
The Nuggets are aware of this unique quirk of Gobert and want to take advantage of this matchup, such as by having Gordon bring the ball up and off Jokic's ball screen, or by having Gordon set up a reverse ball screen for Jokic. I did everything I could.
A key adjustment made by Michael Malone completely nullified the Wolves' initial coverage of Jokic. Aaron Gordon will be either:
1. Screener
2. Ball handlerSo Rudy Gobert entered the game early and was forced to leave his team. pic.twitter.com/o1up3ywQvc
— Joe Viray (@JoeVirayNBA) May 15, 2024
The Timberwolves' response in Game 6 was to switch things up without literally switching things up, telling the player guarding the ball handler to duck under the screen and giving up on the Gobert-to-Jokic switch. There wasn't.
Another issue the Timberwolves had to solve heading into Game 6: Gordon brought the ball up the floor to relieve pressure on Jamal Murray, forcing the Timberwolves to scramble individual half-court matchups. I had no choice but to do it.
With Gordon in that role in Game 5, the Timberwolves stuck to their general rule of pressuring the ball handler from either full court or three-quarters of the court. They put Anthony Edwards and Jaden McDaniels at Gordon. That means Gobert will be guarding either Michael Porter Jr. or Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, two knockdown shooters.
The solution to this is to simply choose not to pressure the bring-up ball handlers other than Jamal Murray and have Gobert guard Gordon, top lock/deny, and play offensive coverage against Murray. , and having Gordon create against Gobert.
The fact that Jokic was held to 22 points on 9-of-19 shooting and Murray was held to 10 points on 4-of-18 shooting is solid evidence that this old-new approach has been incredibly successful. Dew. There's also no denying that missed open shots here and there could have changed the tone of this game and the series as a whole. But the Wolves still deserve to receive the flowers for pushing all their chips forward and cashing their way into Game 7.
Another old adage goes that if madness keeps doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results, then the Wolves should thank madness for surviving (at least) one more game.